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14.1  Introduction 
It was not until the middle of the  nineteenth  century that Canada moved 
into the railroad  era. Although railroads had been built in the United States 
some twenty years earlier, it was during the decade of the 1850s that Canadian 
construction  began  in  earnest.  With only  sixty-six miles of  track  in  1850, 
Central Canada had, within  ten years, nearly 2,000 miles of  track, or  three 
quarters of a mile per thousand inhabitants.’ But far from bringing the share- 
holders the  11 to  15 percent rates of return anticipated, these early railroads 
teetered on the brink of bankruptcy for most of their lives and were national- 
ized in 1917. 
Yet  when it comes to discussions of  Canadian railroads, economists have 
shown far greater interest in the transcontinental or post-Confederation  (1  867) 
phase.2  This is not to say the earlier railroad boom went unnoticed. Economic 
The authors thank Mew Daub, Peter George, Knick Harley, Marvin McInnis, Angela Redish, 
and  Anna Schwartz for helpful comments; and the Social Sciences and  Humanities Research 
Council of Canada for supporting various parts of this project (grants 410-84-1  189 and 410-85- 
0159, respectively). They also are grateful to the late Noel Butlin, who provided them with micro- 
filmed accounts of early Canadian railroads, and this paper is dedicated to his memory. 
I. The Dominion of Canada grew out of the confederation,  in  1867, of most of the existing 
British North American colonies. To help the reader, we use post-Confederation names for the 
provinces of  Central  Canada: Ontario and Quebec. From  1797 to  1841 these provinces were 
known as Upper and Lower Canada, and each had its own legislature. In  1841, the two colonies 
were merged to form the Province of Canada, which differentiated the two areas by calling them 
Canada West and Canada East. With Confederation, the Province of Canada was divided into the 
two existing provinces.  The total railway mileage for Ontario and Quebec in  1861 was  1,856 
miles, and the population of  the region was 2.5 million, most of whom lived in rural areas. See 
J.  M. Trout and Edward Trout, The Rai[ways  of Canada  for 1870-71 (Toronto, 1871). pp. 35-36; 
and Historical Statistics of Canada (2d edn., Ottawa, 1983). pp. A2-14. 
2. The following represents some of  the research on the transcontinental phase.  Harold A. 
Innis, A  History of  the Canadian Pacific Railway (Toronto,  1971); Peter J. George, “Rates of 
Return in  Railway Investment and  Implication for Government Subsidization of  the Canadian 
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historians have extolled the ability of the Province of Canada to build an ex- 
tensive and unified rail system, while telling the usual railroad story of  cor- 
ruption, greed, and government  scandal. A. W.  Currie begins his history  of 
the longest line built, the Grand Trunk Railway, by stating that although this 
company has been “characterized as the world’s worst commercial failure . . . 
it was, in fact, a pioneer-in  design and management, in finance and in the 
economic interrelations  of  Britain, the  United  States and Canada.”3 0. D. 
Skelton makes the same assessment: “there had been waste and mismanage- 
ment, . . . but the railways had brought indirect gain that more than offset the 
direct  A more directly economic perspective is given by William Marr 
and Donald  Paterson  who write:  “examining  only Canadian trade, the rail- 
ways’ contribution to social savings and indirect benefits are clearly positive 
and large,” but “the railways of Central Canada were, on the other hand, not 
an unqualified success.”5 
The generally accepted view is that this first railroad boom, although finan- 
cially unsuccessful,  contributed greatly to the general development of the re- 
gion. This is clearly an ex post assessment of the pre-Confederation construc- 
tion phase. The ex ante expectation, on the other hand, was not only that the 
railroads would contribute to the general development of the region but also 
that private investors would enjoy large financial rewards. It was this combi- 
nation of expected profitability and large social benefits that led the provincial 
government  to promote railway  building.  The Grand  Trunk  Railway  Com- 
pany, for example, received  over &3 million in government loan guarantees 
during its early construction phase. 
Although  the  motivation  for government  involvement  differs,  there  are 
striking parallels between the history of the Grand Trunk Railway Company 
of Canada and the Union Pacific Railroad.6  As Robert Fogel documents, every 
history of the Union Pacific praises the joining of the country from coast to 
coast while at the same time decrying the political maneuvering, bribery, and 
corruption. This is also the history of  the Grand Trunk Railway  (a line that 
linked the Province of  Canada from Sarnia to Montreal and from Montreal to 
Portland on the Atlantic seaboard) since coloring this achievement have been 
claims that the British construction company of  Peto, Brassey, Jackson, and 
Pacific Railway: Some Preliminary Results,” Canadian Journa[ of  Economics,  1 (Nov. 1968),  pp. 
740-62;  Lloyd J. Mercer, “Rates of  Return and Government Subsidization of the Canadian Pacific 
Railway: An Alternate View,” Canadian Journal ofEconomics, 6 (Aug. 1973). pp. 428-37;  and 
T. D. Regehr, The Canadian Northern Railway: Pioneer Road of  the Northern Prairies, 1895- 
1917 (Toronto, 1976). 
3. A. W.  Currie, The Grand TrunkRailway of  Canada (Toronto, 1957). p. 31. 
4. 0. D. Skelton, The Railroad Builders: A Chronicle ofOverlandHighways (Toronto, 1916), 
5.  William L. Marr and Donald G. Paterson, Canada: An Economic History (Toronto, 1980). 
6.  Robert W.  Fogel, The Union Pacijic Railroad: A Case in Premature Enterprise (Baltimore, 
p. 94. 
pp. 318-19. 
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Betts “foisted  a ‘job’ on the Grand Trunk and then quietly withdrew, leaving 
the company to work out its own salvation.” In addition, Sir Francis Hincks, 
premier  of  the province,  and some members  of  his cabinet were  allegedly 
corrupt in their dealings with the railroad. These allegations led to the forma- 
tion of  special legislative committees of investigation, first in 1857 and then 
in 1861.’ 
Given the vast literature on railways, it is surprising that no one has exam- 
ined the  widely  held  view  that lines built during the first Canadian railroad 
boom were privately unprofitable but socially desirable. Here we address this 
issue by examining two of the lines, the Grand Trunk Railway Company of 
Canada and the Great Western Railway Company. Together they  accounted 
for 70 percent of the track built during the 1850s and one, the Grand Trunk, 
received a large amount of government aid. We find that for each line both the 
ex post unaided and ex post aided private rates of return lie below the market 
rate. The ex post social rate of return lies below the market rate for the Grand 
Trunk and above that rate for the Great Western. Our findings on private prof- 
itability  are consistent  with  the historical literature,  but our estimate’ of the 
Grand Trunk’s social profitability  suggests that the &3  million  subsidy it re- 
ceived might have been used more efficiently elsewhere in the economy.* In- 
deed, if some of this aid had been given to the Great Western, it would have 
been in a far more stable financial position. We also argue that the form of the 
government aid, guaranteed bonds, may have contributed to the Grand Trunk 
Railway’s financial difficulties. 
14.2  The Central Canadian Environment and Government Legislation 
The timing and pattern of  railroad construction in Canada differed from its 
southern neighbor.  Not only did the first period of  major construction occur 
later than in the United  States, but government was more directly involved. 
The provincial government granted financial aid, legislated a uniform gauge, 
specified those companies composing the main trunk line, and helped deter- 
mine the location of that line. This occurred while state governments in the 
United States were moving away from direct involvement with  railroad^.^ 
Whatever the lag in actual construction,  Canadian railroad companies be- 
gan to emerge almost as early as in the United States. The first railroad was 
chartered in Central Canada in  1832, and many more were chartered in sub- 
sequent years, but they were unable to proceed with actual construction. The 
capital market in Canada  was small; Ontario,  the province with the largest 
7. Cume, GrandTrunk, pp. 35,67-68. 
8. As noted below, we must be equivocal about this finding because of  the downward biases 
associated with our social return calculation. 
9. For a detailed discussion of American railroad construction and the role of  government, see 
Albert Fishlow, American Railroads and the Transformation of the Ante-Bellum Economy (Cam- 
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number of  companies chartered, was only partially  settled; and the govern- 
ment had  no independent  source of funds.I0 With the union of  Ontario and 
Quebec in  1841 and the rapid growth of  Ontario’s population, some of these 
problems were solved. However, the newly unified province immediately be- 
came involved in canal construction on the St. Lawrence River rather than in 
railroads.  As a result, Ontario and Quebec had, by  1848, a well-developed 
water route from the Upper Lakes to Montreal with a canal capacity that far 
outstripped its shipping requirements. 
The St. Lawrence canal system was intended to channel the products of the 
Great Lakes drainage basin to Montreal and then on to England.  As early as 
1825, the Erie Canal threatened  the primacy  of  the  St. Lawrence, but  the 
Canadian route was protected, at least early on, by the Corn Laws, Navigation 
Acts,  and high American  tariffs.  In  1846 with the end of  colonial privilege 
and with the drawback legislation in the United  States, which allowed prod- 
ucts for reexport to move through that country in bond, the dominance of the 
St. Lawrence route was again put at risk. These events caused a crisis within 
the province and, in spite of the well-developed water route, led to a call for a 
more modem mode of transportation  that would allow the province to com- 
pete for the midwestern trade and reestablish Montreal as a leading entrep8t. 
Vocal demand for railroads elicited a government response, but the govern- 
ment’s intention  was to help the railways acquire  funds on capital markets 
rather than to build lines themselves.  The first general railroad act, the Guar- 
antee Act of 1849, guaranteed the interest on loans of companies chartered by 
the legislature of  the province.I2 The guarantee, which was available to any 
company building a line at least 75 miles long that was at least half completed, 
provided for the interest on a sum up to half the company’s expenditure. But 
the rate was to be no greater than 6 percent; the government was to have first 
charge on the tolls and profits of the company; and no dividends could be paid 
unless a sinking fund equal to 3 percent of the loans outstanding was set aside 
annually. Despite these constraints, it was believed that such aid would make 
it easier for companies to float shares and bonds,  and because the railroads 
would be profitable ventures, the guarantees would cost the government noth- 
ing. In fact most guarantees were eventually converted into cash subsidies. 
In 185  1 the government altered the terms of the Guarantee Act with an “Act 
10. The main source of funds for the British North American colonies at this time was tariff 
revenue. Unfortunately for Ontario, it was upriver from Montreal. Thus all imports were landed 
at Montreal and assessed duty at that port even if the final destination was Ontario. Although a 
formula for the division of  the import duties existed, the share going to Ontario was a continual 
source of conflict. Ontario argued that it was not receiving its due share. Ontario was also growing 
faster than Quebec, and most of the canal construction that Ontario wanted was on the Quebec 
section of the St. Lawrence. To overcome these problems the two provinces united in  1840-41. 
As part of the union agreement, the British government guaranteed the interest payments on a 
El  .5 million loan to be used for improvements to infrastructure. 
1  I. Thomas F. McIlwraith, “Freight Capacity and Utilization of  the Erie and Great Lakes Ca- 
nals before 1850,” Journal ofEconomic  Hisrory, 36 (Dec. 1976), pp. 852-75. 
12. Province of Canada, Legislative Assembly, 1849, 12 Victoriae c. 29. 405  The Profitability of Early Canadian Railroads 
to Make Provision for the Construction of  a Main Trunk Line” (or Main Line 
Act). Now the guarantee was “restricted and confined to those railroads which 
may form part of the said Main Trunk Line.”I3 In essence the government was 
trying to ensure that assisted lines would form part of  a unified system that 
would move commodities and people along the St. Lawrence route. The act 
defined the main trunk line to include those lines that would run from Detroit/ 
Windsor to Montreal and then on to Portland (see Map). The government also 
mandated a gauge, and although restricting  the number  of  lines that  could 
apply for the guarantee, it relaxed the mileage provision.  Now any company 
whose line was longer than 100 miles could divide it into sections of  not less 
than 50 miles, each section being viewed as a distinct railroad for the purposes 
of the act. The act also extended the guarantee provisions to principal as well 
as to interest. A second act was passed in 1851. “An Act to Consolidate and 
Regulate the General Clauses relating to Railways,” otherwise known as “The 
Railway Clauses Consolidation Act,” covered all railroads unless the individ- 
ual acts of incorporation specifically exempted them.  l4  This legislation speci- 
fied various conditions  companies had to meet with respect to capital stock, 
shareholders, bridges, fences, rights-of-way, and so on. 
The provincial government quickly recognized that individual municipali- 
ties would  not be able to provide funds on their own, especially for branch 
and feeder lines now disqualified by the Main Line Act. Thus in  1852, the 
legislature passed an “Act to Establish a Consolidated Municipal Loan Fund 
for Upper Canada” (or Municipal Loan Fund Act). The preamble stated that 
such a fund “would greatly facilitate the borrowing upon advantageous terms 
of such sums as may be required . . . for effecting or aiding in effecting im- 
portant works.” Is This fund allowed individual municipalities to borrow from 
the fund rather than on the open capital market. In return for their debentures, 
municipalities  received cash or provincial debentures which would be given 
to railroad companies in return for stock. These debentures  stated that “the 
Provincial  Government  undertakes to pay  the  principal  sum mentioned  in 
them and the interest thereon, out of monies forming part of the Consolidated 
Municipal  Loan Fund, and out of  no other monies or funds whatsoever.”16 
Although the Municipal Loan Fund Act was intended to be self-financing, the 
provincial government became liable for all monies lent to railroad companies 
by municipalities in the event that the railroads were not successful. In 1859 
the government dissolved the fund and acquired a debt of almost f2  million.17 
13. Ibid., 1851, 14and 15 Vic. c.  73. Therailroadsspecifiedaspartofthemaintrunklinewere 
the Great Western (main line only), the St. Lawrence and Atlantic (Montreal to the Maine border), 
and the Ontario Simcoe and Huron (from Goderich to Buffalo). The Grand Trunk  was formed as 
part of  the main trunk route through the province. 
14. Ibid., c.  51. 
15. Ibid., 1852, 16 Vic. c. 22. 
16. Ibid. 
17. Although the Municipal Loan Fund Act was designed to  aid in the building of branch and 
feeder lines, some of the municipalities used the  fund to  purchase stock in the main trunk line Location of Grand Trunk and Great Western Railway Companies 
Source: D. G.  G.  Ken; Hisrorical Arlas of  Canada (Toronto, 1975), p. 51. 407  The Profitability of Early Canadian Railroads 
14.3  Economic Issues in Canadian Railroad Construction 
The literature on Canadian railroads, summarized briefly above, argues that 
the railroads were necessary  for the continuing development of the country, 
especially in light of railroad development in the United States. The possibil- 
ity that American lines would divert traffic from the existing Canadian infra- 
structure as well as the presumed benefits from having a rail system put pres- 
sure on the government to aid railroad construction. The contemporary view 
was that railroads  would be financially  profitable  but  the  small size of  the 
Canadian capital market made it impossible for them to raise sufficient funds 
locally. Funds could be obtained on the London market,  but here Canadian 
companies were hurt by English investors’ ignorance of the region. This was 
where government bond guarantees could increase accessibility. 
There is  a strong element  of  boosterism  in the contemporary  view  that, 
once constructed, railroads would be privately profitable, but one might have 
expected that the early railroads built through the developed areas of  south- 
western Ontario would be successful. Historians, however, see these lines as 
financial failures even with the government subsidies. The issue of  unaided 
and aided private profitability has been asked of the land-grant American lines 
by Lloyd Mercer and of the Canadian Pacific Railroad by both Mercer and 
Peter George.’*  Mercer finds great variability in the unaided and aided private 
rates of return across the lines studied. Here we follow Mercer’s methodology, 
which allows us to measure the ex post private rates of  return to the Grand 
Trunk and Great Western Railways and to compare these lines with the U.S. 
land-grant railroads and the Canadian Pacific Railway. 
Contemporaries not only argued that the early Canadian railroads would be 
successful, they also convinced the provincial government to aid these com- 
panies on the grounds that the lines would protect the existing trading network 
and  encourage  further development  within  the  region.  The commitment  to 
railroad  development  was,  in fact, a commitment to a policy  of  “defensive 
expansionism.”19 The current view  seems to be that the lines were socially 
profitable and on these grounds government aid was justified. Yet no assess- 
ment has been made of the social profitability of the early Canadian lines and 
in particular of the Grand Trunk line which received the lion’s share of govern- 
ment help.  The question of the social profitability  of  a line is also not new. 
Fogel addressed the issue in his study of the Union Pacific as did Lloyd Mer- 
cer in his study of the land-grant railroads. The methodology of studying so- 
companies. For a full listing of the monies borrowed by the municipalities see the Monetary Times 
(Toronto, 1871). 
18. Lloyd L. Mercer, Railroads and Land Grant Policy (New York, 1982); George, “Rates of 
Return.” 
19. Hugh G. J. Aitken, “Defensive Expansionism: The State and Economic Growth in Can- 
ada,” in The Stare and Economic Growrh, Hugh G. J. Aitken, ed. (New York, 1959). 408  Ann M. Carlos and Frank Lewis 
cia1 profitability  has itself generated much controversy, a point we will return 
to later.*O 
One justification  for governmental  involvement  in the building  of  infra- 
structure is that such projects promote faster growth in a region and, without 
government help, these projects might be delayed. But as Fogel points out, 
inherent in such “premature” enterprises is “a real dichotomy between sound 
private  investment  principles  and  public  or national necessity.”*’ Railroads 
face the additional  problem  that a  market  for their  services often  does not 
develop until after the line is completed. This may require what is sometimes 
described as building ahead of demand, which in turn can create a financial 
obstacle for railroad companies.** They must secure the financing necessary 
to build the line before they earn any revenue. Government loan guarantees 
can alleviate the problem by improving access to capital markets, but such aid 
may  have  serious  consequences for  a  company’s  financial  viability:  bond 
guarantees encourage firms to issue more debt, thereby increasing the likeli- 
hood of  bankrupt~y.~~  We suggest the Grand Trunk Railway may be a case in 
point.  Encouraged  by legislation, it acquired a large bonded debt which put 
the company in  a precarious  financial position.  To  make matters  worse, it 
also was a line for which the private rate of return was far below the market 
rate. 
14.4  Private Rates of Return: The Grand Trunk Railway and the 
Great Western Railway Companies 
The Great Western Railway was initially incorporated in 1834 as the Lon- 
don [Ontario] and Gore Railroad Company. The act of incorporation gave the 
company until  1845 to build a line, but nothing was done. Due to lapse, the 
act was amended and the name of the company changed to the Great Western 
Railway. It was now authorized to build from some point on the Niagara River 
to  Windsor  and  was  to service  the southern  part  of  Ontario, linking  with 
American lines in New York  and Michigan.  Options on 55,000 shares were 
quickly taken in Britain and 5,000 in Canada, but the railroad boom in Britain 
collapsed before any money was paid. The company then took advantage of 
20. Fogel, Union Pacific; Mercer, Railroads and Land Grunt Policy; Stanley Engerman, “Some 
Economic Issues Relating to Railroad Subsidies and the Evaluation of  Land Grants,” Journal of 
EiconomicHisfory, 32 (Sept. 1972). pp. 443-63. 
21. Fogel, Union Pucifc, pp. 23, 165-71, 
22. On the question of building ahead of  demand, see Fishlow, American Railroads. pp. 165- 
71; C. Knick Harley, “Oligopoly Strategy and the Timing of  American Railroad Construction,” 
Journal of  Economic History, 42 (Nov.  1982), pp. 797-824;  and Engerman, “Some Economic 
Issues .” 
23. Fogel, Union Pacific. p. 55;  Frank Lewis and Mary MacKinnon, “Government Loan Guar- 
antees and the Failure of  the Canadian Northern Railway,”  Journal ofEconomic History, 47 (Mar. 
1987), pp. 175-96. 409  The Profitability of Early Canadian Railroads 
the Guarantee Act to sell stock and bonds. Construction commenced in 1851, 
and the line was open for traffic in late 1853  .24 
The history  of the Grand Trunk Railway  is more complex.25  This railway 
grew out of a desire on the part of  the British North American colonies for an 
all-weather link. By 1850, it was believed that the Imperial Parliament in Brit- 
ain would subsidize an intercolodial line, and the British construction firm of 
Peto, Brassey, Jackson, and Betts showed interest in building it. But with the 
decision of Lord Derby and the English government not to help with financ- 
ing,  the  Premier  of  Canada, Sir Francis Hincks,  opened direct discussions 
with Pet0 and associates. The line was initially intended to run from Montreal 
to Toronto  where it would join the Great Western,  but through  a  series of 
particular  circumstances,  the Grand  Trunk was extended from Montreal  to 
Quebec City and from Toronto to Sarnia on Lake Huron. The Grand Trunk 
also leased the St. Lawrence and Atlantic which ran from Montreal to Port- 
land. Once completed, the Grand Trunk, at over 1,000 miles, was one of the 
longest railways in existence.  Because of its length and because of the direct 
involvement of  Hincks, the company was allowed to use the Guarantee Act 
up to only E616 ($3,000)  per mile rather than  for fully half of  the cost of 
construction. 
The first question addressed here is the extent to which the Grand Trunk 
and Great Western Railways, which accounted for over 70 percent of track in 
the province,  were privately profitable.  We derive ex post private rates of re- 
turn using the same approach as Lloyd Mercer in his analysis of six American 
land-grant railroads and the Canadian Pacific Railway mentioned above.26  The 
internal rate of return is the solution to: 
where R  is the operating revenue, C is the operating cost, I is gross investment 
expenditures, A is the estimated value of the firm in the terminal year, and r is 
the internal rate of return. Like Mercer we adjust for the cost of leased lines 
and also base our estimates on actual construction cost rather than on the book 
value of  each  railway’s  securities.  Actual  construction  costs  and  the  book 
value of a railway’s securities will diverge if the stocks and bonds of the com- 
pany are discounted. In this latter regard the Grand Trunk did issue discounted 
securities. All too often in the railroad literature discounting has been taken 
as evidence of stock manipulation,  but this is only one reason why securities 
24. The most accessible histories of the Great Western Railway Company are in Currie, Grand 
Trunk, chaps. 8  and 9; and  in  Norman Thompson and  Major  J. H. Edgar,  Canadian Railway 
Developmenrfrom the Earliest Times (Toronto, 1933). chap. 2. 
25. The standard history of this company is Cunie, Grand Trunk. 
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might  sell at a discount. As Fogel  points  out in  his  analysis  of  the  Union 
Pacific, railroad companies might be forced to sell securities at a discount to 
obtain sufficient funding to allow them to commence construction or to finish 
construction  already started. The existence of  laws limiting the interest rate 
payable on the securities could also result in a security selling at a discount. 
We argue below, however, that the discounted bonds that Grand Trunk issued 
may have had more to do with the type of aid the railway received than with 
any usury laws or even the inherent riskiness of the project. 
The rate of return to the Grand Trunk is derived for the period from 1853, 
the year in which it was formed, to 1882, the year in which it amalgamated 
with the Great Western. Figure 14.1 shows the path of revenue, expenses, and 
net revenue from 1853 to  1882. Our estimates  are based on the company’s 
semi-annual reports, which offer a complete series of revenues and costs, in- 
cluding capital  The Grand Trunk was grossly over-capitalized. Bonds, 
and especially  shares, sold at large discounts, and the company often issued 
securities in lieu of interest or dividend payments. As a result,  the reported 
capitalization exceeded the true cost of  the line, the rolling stock, and other 
physical  assets. To  allow for this, we  include  in gross investment only re- 
ported expenditures, excluding interest, discounts, and other components that 
entered the company’s capital account. Indeed, even reported investment out- 
lays must be  adjusted downward. As Currie notes, Pet0 and Company, the 
chief  contractor for the Grand Trunk, received  some payments in company 
bonds  and shares.28  These were  valued  at par  for the purpose of  recording 
expenditure by the railroad even though their market values were much less. 
To compensate, Pet0 and Company inflated its reported costs. In deriving our 
estimates we, therefore, have  used  the market  value of  securities to adjust 
reported capital expenditures downward.29 
Table 14.1 presents the book value, reported capital cost, and adjusted cap- 
ital cost for selected periods. The book  value of the Grand Trunk  approxi- 
mated  its construction cost  in  1853 and  1854; and in  1855 its book  value 
exceeded true expenditures by only 5 percent,  but by  1857 book value was 
nearly 25 percent above expenditures. During the 1860s and 1870s, the book 
value of the Grand Trunk continued to grow rapidly despite a sharp decline in 
27. Grand Trunk Railway Company of Canada, Half Yearly Reports of the Directors, 1853-82. 
28. Cume, Grand Trunk, pp. 41-46. 
29. A complete breakdown of payments made to Peto and Co. over the period 1853-56  is given 
in  Canada, Parliamentary Legislative Assembly, Report of  the Special Committee Appointed to 
Enquire and Report as to the Condition. Management and Prospects of  the Grand Trunk Railway 
(Toronto, 1857). p. 180. Peto and Co. received payment in Grand Trunk “B” shares, “B” bonds, 
and the shares and debentures of the Atlantic and St. Lawrence Railway. All were selling at a 
discount. Our estimated construction cost is based on the market values rather than the face values 
of  the railway securities at the time they were received by the contractor. We  allow for the fact 
that Peto and Co. paid €12.5 for each “B” share it received. See Cunie, The Grand TrunkRailway, 
p. 41. 411  The Profitability of Early Canadian Railroads 
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Fig. 14.1  Grand Runk Railway Revenues and Expenses 
Source: Appendix Table 14A. 1. 
Table 14.1  Capital Cost of the Grand nunk  Railway for Selected Dates 
(in thousands off sterling) 
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30 June 1854 
30June 1855 
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Sources: Grand Trunk Railway Company of  Canada; Report of  the Directors to the Bond and 
Stockholders, and Statement of the Revenue and Capital Accounts for the Half-Years ending 30 
June and 31  December,  1853-82;  The London  Times,  Railway Intelligence Column, 1853 to 
1882; and A. W.  Currie, The Grand Trunk Railway of  Canada (Toronto, 1957). 412  Ann M. Carlos and Frank Lewis 
the rate of gross investment. As a result, by I880 the railway’s book value was 
more than double its true capital cost.30 
Much of  the negative assessment of  the Grand Trunk, both by contempora- 
ries and historians, may be due in part to a comparison of  the railway’s net 
returns to its book  value.  Certainly on the basis of  such a comparison, the 
railway did very poorly. We  estimate an ex post  (unaided) private return of 
-  3.7 percent. As a reflection of  the return to the project, this rate is far too 
low.  In Table 14.2, we present ex post private rates of  return using our best 
estimates of  the railway’s actual cost. We estimate that, unaided, the railway 
would have provided private investors a return of  1.7 percent.  This is much 
lower than the normal rate for the period, which was about 6 percent, and also 
lower than any of the equivalent rates estimated by Mercer for the railroads in 
his sample.3’ Although  the private return is low, it is not unusually so com- 
pared  with the Canadian Pacific Railway, generally regarded  as the success 
story of  Canadian railway history.  Mercer estimates that unaided, the Cana- 
dian  Pacific  Railway  would  have yielded  an ex post  return of  2.4 percent, 
which is only 0.7 percent above the rate we estimate for the Grand Trunk.32 
The Grand Trunk Railway,  like the Canadian Pacific, was subsidized,  al- 
30. In  1880 the book  value of the Grand Trunk was 2.15 times its estimated capital cost. Of 
Mercer’s railroads, only the Northern Pacific and Central Pacific had higher ratios, 2.36 and 3.17, 
respectively (Mercer, Land  Grunr, Table A-15, pp. 176-77). 
3  I. This estimate  is  based on the assumption that the Grand Trunk was a fully maintained 
system. The railway made large outlays for maintenance and renewal of  track and rolling stock, 
and these expenditures were charged to its operating account. In fact, the renewals in some cases 
led to the upgrading of old capital. We therefore base our rate-of-return estimates on a zero depre- 
ciation rate, but to the extent rolling stock and track were upgraded, our estimates would be biased 
downward. Another possible source of bias is our failure to deflate any of the railway’s costs or 
revenues. This is dictated by  the lack of a good general price index for Canada. If, however, the 
U.S. experience and the available Canadian data can  be taken as a guide,  the period 1853-80 
appears to have been one of  general price stability (note: Canada was not subject to as much of the 
U.S. Civil War inflation). If anything, by  1880 prices likely trended downward, implying that as 
measures of the real rate of return our estimates are biased downward. Finally, it should be noted 
that the (nominal) rate of return on riskless securities remained fairly stable at about 6 percent. 
Government of Canada bonds, sold on the London market, carried a coupon rate of  6 percent. 
32. This is based on the comparison using Mercer’s “C’ adjustment. Mercer assumes a depre- 
ciation rate of  1.97  percent which appears to have been appropriate given that it implies a terminal 
adjustment roughly equal to the market value of the firm’s securities (Land  Grunr, chap. 4). The 
unaided and aided rates of return (using terminal adjustment C) are: 
Railroad  Unaided  Aided 
Central Pacific  10.6  11.6 
Union Pacific  11.6  13.1 
Great Northern  8.7  10.0 
Texas and Pacific  2.2  4.3 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe  6.  I  7.1 
Northern Pacific  6.3  9.2 
Canadian Pacific  2.4  8.4 
Thus the Grand Trunk performed more poorly than any of the lines in Mercer’s study, including 
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Table 14.2  Private and Social Rates of  Return, Grand Bunk  and Great Western 
Railways (in percentages) 
Grand Trunk  Great Western 
Actual  I January  Actual 
Starting Date  1861  Starting Date 
Private rate of return 
Unaided  1.71%  2.25%  4.06% 
Aided  3.00  4.79  5.20 
Social rate of  return  2.77  3.57  6.10 
Notes:  The present value of leased lines for the Grand Trunk is €1,538,000 based on the actual 
starting date, and f1,142,000  assuming a starting date of  1 January  1961. The social rates of 
return are based on the estimated value of c/p*,  which is 0.77 for the Grand Trunk and 0.69 for 
the Great Western. in deriving the estimate of c/p* for the Grand Trunk, the decade of the 1850s 
was excluded. 
Sources: Grand Trunk Railway Company of Canada: Report of  the Directors to the Bond and 
Stockholders, and Statement of the Revenue and Capital Accounts for the Half-Years ending 30 
June and 31 December,  1853-82.  Great Western Railway of Canada; Report of the Directors of 
the Great Western Railway of  Canada for the Half-Years ending 3 1 July and 3 1 January, 1852- 
80. A detailed account of the derivation of  these numbers is given in  the text and footnotes 29 
through 35. 
though the subsidy came in a different form. The Canadian Pacific received 
direct aid: cash grants, land grants, and aid to construction; whereas the Grand 
Trunk  was  provided  guaranteed  provincial  debentures  under the Guarantee 
Act. When issued, these  debentures were  given first priority on the firm’s 
assets, but  as the financial position  of  the  firm worsened,  the priority  was 
reduced and eventually both interest and principal were forgiven. The railway 
received these debentures between  1853 and 1858, by which time they totaled 
f3,115,000 sterling. Incorporating  this subsidy in our calculations  gives an 
aided private rate of  return  of  3.0  This rate  is far below the  8.4 
percent  ex post  aided rate of  return  estimated  by Mercer for the Canadian 
Pacific. The small gap in unaided  rates  and the large gap in aided rates of 
return suggests that differences in the ex post profitability  of  the projects to 
the private investors had  more to do with the size and type of subsidy each 
railway received than to differences in their intrinsic profitability. 
The Grand Trunk is sometimes criticized in the historical literature for hav- 
ing been, in Fogel’s terms, a premature enterprise. Certainly the railway’s net 
returns during the 1850s were very low. Early problems with construction may 
account for part of the poor performance, but  more fundamental  may have 
been the lack of demand for rail services in the early years. To test the propo- 
sition that the  1853 starting date was too early, we have recomputed rates of 
return  starting in  1861 but  otherwise apply the same aggregate  investment 
33. This rate is computed as above, deducting from investment expenditures the (face) value of 
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 expenditure^.^^ Our estimates provide some support for the view that the en- 
terprise was premature.  Had construction of  the Grand Trunk lines been de- 
layed to 1861, the unaided rate of return would have increased by 0.5 percent, 
which  would  have made the railway  comparable to the Canadian Pacific in 
intrinsic  profitability.  More importantly,  with  the delay in construction,  the 
same government  subsidy  would  have  provided  a rate  of  return  to private 
investors only about one percent below the normal rate of 6 
The Great  Western was one of  the  first railway  companies to operate in 
Canada, commencing operations in late 1853. It ran through some of the most 
populated areas of southwestern Ontario and provided an important link to the 
U.S. Midwest. It also was viewed ex ante as profitable and successful. Com- 
pany bonds and shares sold quickly and at a premium in the London market. 
Yet  this line, like the Grand Trunk, has been viewed as a commercial failure. 
As Currie puts it: “From first to last it was badly managed.”36 While Currie’s 
view of the management may be valid, the ex post rates of return implied by 
the  revenue  and  cost data  suggest that the  Great Western was significantly 
more profitable than either the Grand Trunk or the Canadian Pacific (see Fig- 
ure 14.2 and Table 14.2). We estimate the unaided private rate of return to be 
4.1 percent.  Although  this  is below  the normal rate, it exceeds the rates of 
return  on the Canadian  Pacific and Grand Trunk by  1.7 and 2.4 percentage 
points, re~pectively.~’ 
The provincial government offered loan guarantees to the Great Western as 
it did to the Grand Trunk, but these guarantees were, in total, much smaller, 
&700,000 rather than &3,115,000. In July 1860 the loan guarantees were only 
13 percent of the company’s book value (&5,204,000)  and only 15 percent of 
the estimated capital cost (&4,568,000).  The latter figure for the Grand Trunk 
was roughly 30 percent. In addition, since the loans to the Great Western were 
almost fully  repaid,  almost  no subsidy was granted  ex post.  Had the  loan 
guarantees  been  converted  into  a  subsidy,  investors  in  the  Great  Western 
34. For this calculation, investment expenditures in the hypothetical initial year (1861) are the 
cumulated investment expenditures over the period 1853-61.  The capital value of leased lines is 
the discounted (at 6 percent) sum of all payments for leased lines from  1861 to  1881. Our esti- 
mates assume no lag between completion of a line and demand for rail services. Although this 
clearly is inappropriate in cases where a rail link is a prerequisite to settlement, the Grand Trunk, 
like the Great Western, was built through an already settled area. Indeed, the Great Western en- 
joyed high operating revenues as soon as the line was completed. The year 1861 also marks the 
start of the US.  Civil War, which may have adversely affected earnings. Both companies reported 
large losses due to discounts on revenues received in U.S. dollars. However, to the extent that 
U.S. freight rates rose, this compensated for the change in exchange rates. Also the volume of 
through-freight increased as trade was diverted from the Mississippi. 
35. This calculation is based on the assumption that the present value of the government subsidy 
would have been the same. The actual subsidy payments are compounded at 6 percent to 1861. 
36. Cunie, Grand Trunk, p. 218. 
37.  As  with the Grand  Trunk,  we  assume expenditures on maintenance and  renewals were 
sufficient to assure no depreciation of the Great Western’s capital stock. The assumption of a zero 
depreciation rate implies a terminal capital stock in  1880 of f7.838.000,  which is very close to 
the market value of the firm’s securities in that year. 415  The Profitability of Early Canadian Railroads 








Fig. 14.2  Great Western Railway Revenues and Expenses 
Source: Appendix Table 14A.2. 
would have earned a rate of return of 5.2 percent, suggesting that a relatively 
small subsidy would have made the Great Western a privately profitable ven- 
ture. 
14.5  Social Rates of Return: The Grand lhnk  Railway 
and Great Western Railway 
More important than the issue of private profitability, at least from a policy 
perspective, is the question of whether the government decision to encourage 
the railways to proceed was appropriate. To  help answer this question we have 
derived social rates of return based on estimates of the consumers’ surplus for 
those  who  demanded  railroad  services.  This approach  is  conceptually  the 
same as social savings,  since social savings also measures the net benefit of 
using railroads rather than a higher cost alternative; however, because we must 
choose a somewhat arbitrary demand elasticity, our estimates are necessarily 
less accurate. The demand elasticities we select are based on the assumption 
that the Grand Trunk and Great Western priced as profit-maximizing  monop- 
olist~.~~  This allows us to generate what we regard as plausible, downwardly 
biased estimates of the true social rate of return. In Figure 14.3, we represent 
38. Since the railways had monopoly power and appeared able to set their own freight and 
passenger rates, assuming monopoly pricing seems reasonable. To  the extent, however, that the 
railways priced below the monopoly level, our estimates of the social rate of  return would be 
biased downward. 416  Ann M. Carlos and Frank Lewis 
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Fig. 14.3  Estimating the Social Return to Railways 
consumers’ surplus assuming a linear demand and a constant marginal 
Under these assumptions the per-period social return is given by 
where p is price, q is output, c is marginal cost, and a is price where demand 
is zero. Substituting the profit-maximizing condition: 
(3) 
a+c  p* = __ 
2’ 
we derive the social return to be 
(4)  SR  * -  -  P*4*  -13  - $} - c~*, 
2 
where an asterisk indicates the profit-maximizing value. From equation (4) it 
follows that the private return is converted to the social return by multiplying 
39. A  linear demand is consistent with a location model in  which the intensity of  activity is 
independent of  distance to the market.  To  the extent that intensity declines with distance,  our 
estimate of the social return would be biased downward. See Frank D. Lewis and David R. Rob- 
inson, “The Timing of  Railway Construction  on the Canadian Prairies,” Canadian Journal of 
Economics,  17 (May 1984), pp. 344-45;  Ann M. Carlos, “Land Use, Supply, and Welfare Dis- 
tortions Induced by Inefficient Freight Rates,” Canadian  Journal  ufEconomics, 21 (Nov. 1988), 
pp. 835-45.  Assuming constant marginal cost may bias our social return estimates upward since, 
with upward-sloping marginal cost, marginal cost exceeds average variable cost. This potential 
bias, however, is likely very small since neither the Grand Trunk  nor the Great Western were 
operating near capacity, the implication being that marginal cost was not rising steeply if at all. 417  The Profitability of Early Canadian Railroads 
total revenue by a factor that depends on the ratio of  marginal cost to price. 
Note that  if  c  = p*,  the firm, as a profit-maximizer,  must  face a perfectly 
elastic demand, in which case the social and private return would be the same. 
The ratio, clp', is central to the social return calculation. For both railways we 
base it on the ratio of all costs, excluding capital costs,  to total revenue.  It 
should be noted that expenditures on maintenance and renewals are included 
in operating costs. To  the extent that these are more appropriately treated as 
part of capital, we are overstating the ratio, c/p*, and hence understating the 
social return.40  Recognizing that our estimates are biased downward, we esti- 
mate that the Great Western Railway generated a social rate of return of 6.1 
percent,  which  is just above the normal  rate of  6 percent.  Therefore,  even 
though the Great Western was not a privately  profitable  project,  our social 
return estimate suggests it was a socially desirable one. 
Our estimate for the Grand Trunk Railway has a very different implication. 
We  estimate  that the  social rate of return  was 2.8 percent,  well  below  the 
normal rate.  Had the project been delayed, though, the social rate of return 
would have been higher. If an 1861 starting date is assumed, the social rate of 
return is estimated to be 3.6 percent. This suggests that the problem with the 
Grand Trunk was partly one of timing.  Perhaps the government was overly 
optimistic about the early demand for rail services or overly optimistic about 
the ability of the operators during the early years to run a socially desirable if 
not privately profitable line. Finally, given the biases associated with our pro- 
cedure, we can conclude only that the Grand Trunk may have been a socially 
undesirable investment. 
14.6  Financing the Grand 'bunk Railway 
As  shown in Table  14.1 and also noted  by Cume, the Grand Trunk was 
financed with discounted stocks and bonds. The use of discounted bonds-in 
modem parlance, junk bonds-may  appear inconsistent  with the insights of 
Modigliani-Miller.  According to the simplest version of their model, the value 
of  a firm does not depend on the proportions of the firm's  investment which 
are financed with debt and equity. That model, however, assumes no bank- 
ruptcy costs. Where bankruptcy costs are significant, the optimal strategy is 
to avoid these costs completely by issuing debt with a face value no greater 
than the liquidation value of the firm. Since such debt will be fully secured by 
the firm's  assets,  it follows that the optimal strategy is inconsistent with the 
40. Mercer derives his social rate of  return by  adding estimates of  intraregional benefits and 
passenger external benefits to total revenue. Intraregional benefits are inconsistent with the linear 
demand we have  assumed. Mercer's  estimates of  the passenger external benefits are generally 
between 30 and 40 percent of  total revenue. This is more than double the external benefit we 
derive. Part of  the difference may be due to the availability of  good substitutes for the Canadian 
railways, but part is likely due as well to our attempt to understate benefits. Our estimated elastic- 
ities of demand at equilibrium are 3.2 for the Great Western and 4.3 for the Grand Trunk. See 
Mercer, Land Grunt, app. B and C. 418  Ann M. Carlos and Frank Lewis 
issuing of discounted or  junk bonds. This result extends to very risky projects, 
which should be financed almost entirely with equity. 
In  their  analysis of  a  post-Confederation  prairie  railroad,  the  Canadian 
Northern  Railway,  Frank Lewis and Mary MacKinnon  have shown that the 
optimal debt condition changes if the government offers to guarantee some of 
the firm’s debt.41  The firm now maximizes its ex ante present value by issuing 
debt with a face value equal to the sum of  its liquidation value and the full 
amount of the guarantees. This implies a positive bankruptcy probability be- 
cause the firm’s assets may not be sufficient to cover all debts. Whether or not 
the  firm’s bonds sell at  a discount, however,  also depends  on how certain 
investors are of  a government bailout in the event of  bankruptcy.  In the case 
of the Canadian Northern, for example, bonds were not discounted despite a 
high bankruptcy probability, because the railway’s debt was fully secured by 
a combination of the firm’s assets and the government guarantees. 
The same was not true of  the Grand Trunk, and the difference, we argue, 
was in the nature of  the government commitment. The Grand Trunk, Great 
Western, and Canadian Northern received loan guarantees,  but in the case of 
the Grand Trunk, the status of the loan guarantee was unclear.  At the outset 
the loan guarantees had first priority on the firm’s assets, but once the Grand 
Trunk got into serious financial difficulty, the status of  the government loans 
was reduced. Now company bonds had first call on the assets of  the company. 
Since ex post the status of the guarantee changed, we argue that ex ante the 
value of the government loan guarantee was uncertain. Indeed, as we discuss 
later, although the government made a definite commitment initially, the view 
of the investors was of a much more open-ended government policy.42 
We  model this arrangement by assuming that the government offers a loan 
guarantee that is uncertain; that is, will be honored with a probability less than 
one. Bonds with first claim on the firm’s assets are secure, but those backed 
by the uncertain loan guarantee have an ex ante value of: 
where G is the face value of the loan guarantee, T is the probability of bank- 
ruptcy, and p  is the probability the guarantee will be honored in the event of 
bankruptcy.  In this formulation, the larger the (potential) loan guarantee,  G, 
the  higher  the probability  of bankruptcy  (since the  firm will  take on  more 
debt), and hence the greater the discount on the unsecured bonds. 
The provincial loan guarantees to the Grand Trunk Railway, which totalled 
41. Lewis and MacKinnon, “Government Loan Guarantees.” 
42. The government commitment to the Great Western was far less strong. This was made clear 
with the formation of the Grand Trunk. With the Main Line Act of  1851, the government incor- 
porated the main line of the Great Western as part of the main trunk line. But once the Grand 
Trunk was extended from Toronto to Samia, the government sought to have that section as the 
trunk link instead of the Great Western. This would have disallowed the Great Western from any 
loan guarantees. Although the government was not successful, the incident showed its commit- 
ment to the two companies. 419  The Profitability of Early Canadian Railroads 
&3,111,500 by 30 June  1858, were given priority over the railway’s assets. 
This reduced  the effective guarantee. However,  the status of  the provincial 
debentures was reduced in the late 1850s, suggesting the government commit- 
ment to the Grand Trunk extended beyond the initial value of the early loans. 
Provincial support for the Grand Trunk was less certain than in the case of the 
Canadian Northern  Railway; nevertheless,  the  guarantees  still  allowed  the 
Grand Trunk to raise  substantial  amounts on the bond market.  It should be 
noted, however, that because the support from the government was uncertain, 
these bonds sold at a 
Government  subsidies mattered.  In its review of  1852, the London Times 
reported: 
During the concluding portion of the year, various loans and enterprises of 
all descriptions, home and foreign were introduced,  the chief temptation 
employed being that of  state guarantees  . . . a system mainly traceable to 
the want of self-reliance, which, since the railway Mania has led people to 
prefer any undertaking backed with even as indifferent guarantee to the no- 
blest enterprises dependent upon their own judgement  .44 
Subsequent to the sale of the Grand Trunk  shares, the Times laid out the 
level and the type of government involvement.  At the same time, the public 
was given a somewhat wider interpretation of  this aid package, one that im- 
plied a more open-ended commitment. Columnists talked about the line being 
“supported  by  the government”  and  that  “in  Canada the  Board  comprises 
some of the principal members of Parliament.” Potential investors were told 
that in matters relating to the Grand Trunk that they “had to deal with Messrs. 
Glyn and Baring as the financial agents of the Canadian G~vernment.”~~  In 
addition, when the prospectus  for the line was issued, appended to it was a 
report on the growth potential of the province from Lord Elgin, the Governor 
General, to Sir John Pakington, the Colonial Secretary. Although the report 
says nothing about the Grand Trunk, by using it in this manner the company 
“sought  to convey  the  impression  that  Lord  Elgin  was endorsing  the Rail- 
way.”46  Thus, while investors were informed of the actual nature of the aid, 
the packaging in which this information was placed suggested the possibility 
of a greater government role. 
Certainly complaints of the shareholders in early 1861, when the company 
was once again in serious financial difficulty, suggest that some had a wider 
interpretation of the level of government support. Investors wrote: 
43. When the company introduced its 6 percent bond in July  1854, it sold at 93 to 95 on a 100 
face value. Two years later, it was selling for 84 to 86. By 1858 the discount had risen yet again, 
and the bond sold for 72 to 77. 
44. London Times. 1  January 1852, Money Markets and City Intelligence column. 
45. Ibid. 
46. Cume, Grand Trunk, p. 21, Lord Elgin’s report  was not appended to the prospectus when 
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it was in bona$de reliance upon the representations put forward as from the 
Canadian Government in this [GTR] prospectus that, in 1853, the petition- 
ers and other persons became subscribers to the Grand Trunk Railway, and 
in the full persuasion that a Colonial Government which had sought assist- 
ance in England in a form so public and conspicuous would at all times be 
ready to extend to the obligations thus incurred.47 
Herapath’s Railway and  Commercial Journal  summed up the  views  of the 
ordinary bond holders in a similar manner. It traced 
the whole of the misfortunes of the company to the conduct of the Canadian 
Government, since the Government knowing the quantity of traffic the line 
would have, must have been aware that it was not just to ask English people 
for their capital for such an enterprise unsupported and unprotected  by  a 
guarantee  .48 
Although both quotations describe only after the fact what people believed, 
they do suggest that at least some of the investors saw the government com- 
mitment as being more open-ended than laid out in the Guarantee Act. This 
would, in turn, affect the quantity of bonds which the company could sell and, 
because of the uncertain nature of  the commitment,  these bonds would have 
to sell at a discount. Indeed, the debt-equity ratio was far in excess of what is 
considered appropriate for a non-subsidized  firm.49  In  1854 the ratio was high 
but  still a fairly  reasonable  1.7, but  by  1858 the  ratio was  3.0 (see Table 
14.3).50  Moreover, because much of  this debt had been sold at a discount, the 
face value of  the firm’s debt on 30 June 1858 was 82 percent of actual capital 
expenditures. This meant that an ex post return just slightly below the normal 
rate of return would have been enough, in the absence of government support, 
to drive the firm into bankruptcy. Of course the actual ex post return was far 
below  the  normal rate.  Despite this the railway’s bonds,  while  discounted, 
still  sold  at prices  substantially  higher  than  the company’s   share^.^'  These 
prices, then, must have reflected not investor confidence in the viability of the 
Grand Trunk but rather the view, eventually  borne out, that the government 
would bail investors out should the railway get into more serious trouble. 
47. Trout and Trout, The Railways of Canada, p. 78. 
48. Cume, Grand Trunk, p. 74. 
49. In the twentieth century, debt-equity ratios for railroads that did not go bankrupt were close 
to one. See Lewis and MacKinnon, “Government Loan Guarantees,” p. 184. 
50. This effect of  government loan guarantees on the debt-equity ratios of  railroads is also 
consistent with the U.S. experience. In the antebellum period, before government became heavily 
involved with railroad building, the debt-equity ratios of  U.S. railroads averaged only 0.8. See 
Fishlow, American Railroads, p.  187. This was in contrast to the postbellum experience of Mer- 
cer’s land-grant railroads, which all received loan guarantees. In the mid 1890s, their debt-equity 
ratios averaged 1.8. In fact, of the railroads in Mercer’s study only the Canadian Pacific Railway 
received no loan guarantees,  and its debt-equity ratio was just 0.6. See Poor’s Manual of  Rail- 
roads, 1896 (New York, 1896) pp. 354,553,555,696,893,913,922,996. 
51. In late June  1858, Grand Trunk shares were selling at a discount of 55 percent from par, 
while company bonds were selling at only a 20 percent discount (London, Times, Railway Intel- 
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Table 14.3  Capital Structure of the Grand ’kunk Railway Company, 1854-1858 
(in thousands off sterling) 
Bonds (Face Value)  Shares 
Provincial  Other  Face  Market  Debt/ 
Year  Debentures  Debentures  Total  Value  Value  Equity 
1854  f  467.5  €1,260.5  €1,728.0  f1,253.1  f1.026.1  1.68 
1855  1,776.3  1,929.1  3,705.5  1,860.0  1,326.7  2.79 
1856  2,793.8  1,768.7  4,562.5  2,753.9  1,931.4  2.36 
1857  3,044.8  1,943.7  4,988.5  3,097.6  2,101.3  2.37 
1858  3,111.5  3,330.5  6,442.0  3,206.1  2,172.6  2.97 
Sources; Grand Trunk Railway Company of  Canada; Report of  the Directors to the Bond  and 
Stockholders, and Statement of the Revenue and Capital Accounts for the Half-Years ending 30 
June and 31 December, 1853-82. 
The financing of the Great Western is also consistent with our view of im- 
plicit  and  explicit  government  loan  guarantees.  In  contrast  to  the  Grand 
Trunk, the Great Western received  little support ex ante and almost none ex 
post.52  This comparative lack of government involvement was reflected in the 
way the railway was financed. The debt-equity ratio remained well below  1 
throughout its history and, unlike the Grand Trunk, the Great Western sold no 
junk bonds.  Even  when  its  shares were  selling  at significant  discounts,  its 
bonds sold very close to par or, typically, at a premium. 
The experience of  the Grand Trunk may have implications for the financial 
problems currently facing U.S. firms and banks that became involved in the 
junk bond market. Some savings and loan associations were among the heav- 
iest purchasers of junk bonds, and many  are threatened with bankruptcy  or 
have gone bankrupt. Most of  their losses though, will be covered by the U.S. 
federal government  which by  law  insures these banks’  deposits.s3 This, of 
course, was known when the risky investments were undertaken. Thus deposit 
insurance,  which is a form of  government loan guarantee, may explain why 
some savings and loan associations became big players in the junk bond mar- 
ket and made other very risky investments, mainly in real estate. 
14.7  Conclusion 
The Great Western and the Grand Trunk Railways were two of  the earliest 
lines built in the Province of Canada. Together they constituted over 70 per- 
52. Under the Guarantee Act, the Great Western received f700,000 in bond guarantees over the 
period 1852 to  1854 and some interest payments were deferred. Eventually the company repaid 
more than 90 percent of the face value of the loan. See Cume, Grand Trunk, pp. 191-92. 
53. As of  December  1990, savings and loan institutions as a group owned only 5 percent of 
U.S. high-yield bonds. This was in  part because the U.S. government, through the Resolution 
Trust Corporation, had already acquired a large portfolio of junk bonds from failed S&L’s, and in 
part because only a small segment of the industry had purchased these securities. See The Econo- 
misf, 30 March-5  April 1991, p. 73. 422  Ann M. Carlos and Frank Lewis 
cent of  the rail line constructed during the decade of the 1850s. The historical 
literature on these two companies argues that, although they turned out to be 
privately  unprofitable,  they  were  socially necessary for the development  of 
the  area. For  this  latter reason  the  government  was  correct  in  subsidizing 
them. We attempted here to assess the historical view by measuring the degree 
to which these two lines were privately or socially profitable. 
We began by estimating the unaided and aided private rates of return to the 
Great Western and the Grand Trunk. Our unaided private rates of return show 
that the current historical literature is correct in its assessment. Both lines had 
ex post private  rates of return  below the market rate.  At the same time the 
Great Western performed better than the Canadian Pacific,  which is consid- 
ered to be a “successful” line in Canadian historiography, and the Grand Trunk 
performed just marginally worse than the Canadian Pacific. The government 
subsidized the Grand Trunk and, to a much lesser degree, the Great Western, 
but our estimates of  the aided private rates of  return show that the subsidies 
were not large enough to make either railway privately profitable. 
Our examination of the social rates of return for these two companies shows 
that although  the Great Western was a socially profitable venture, the same 
cannot be said for the Grand Trunk; but we cannot state that the Grand Trunk 
was  a socially  unprofitable  venture either because of  the  downward-biased 
nature of our calculation. It is possible that with a more complete accounting 
of all benefits, the Grand Trunk could be shown to have been a socially desir- 
able line as well. 
The aid given to Canadian railroad  companies came in the form of  bond 
guarantees.  In the case of the Grand Trunk,  we argue that the form of  the 
subsidy and the market perception of  government actions resulted  in a very 
high debt-to-equity ratio. It also resulted, down the road, in a situation where 
the government was forced to “bail out” the Grand Trunk to preserve the sta- 
bility of the market for Canadian bonds. 423  The Profitability of  Early Canadian Railroads 
Appendix 
Table 14A.1  Grand Runk Railway Revenues and Expenses 
(in thousands of  E sterling) 
Operating  Operating  Net  Investment 
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Table 14A.1  (continued) 
~  ~ 
Operating  Operating  Net  Investment 


















































































Source: Grand  Trunk  Railway  Company of  Canada; Report of  the Directors to  the  Bond  and 
Stockholders, and Statement of the Revenue and Capital Accounts for the Half-Years ending (a) 
30 June and (b) December, 1853-82. 425  The Profitability of Early Canadian Railroads 
Table 14A.2  Great Western Railway Revenues and Expenses 
(in thousands oft  sterling) 
Operating  0  per at  i n  g  Net  Investment 
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Table 14A.2  (continued) 
~ 
Operating  Operating  Net  Investment 
























































Sources: Great Western Railway of Canada; Report of the Directors of the Great Western Railway 
of Canada for the Half-Years ending (a) 31 July and (b) 31 January, 1852-80. 